![]() ![]() In 1927, he writes that “After the drama, poem, ballad in film, October presents a new form of cinema: a collection of essays on a series of themes which constitute October.” (Eisenstein 1976, 4) Eisenstein’s intellectual ambition is apparent, but what of his achievement? Eisenstein did not think of it as a mere depiction of the revolution, however. It depicts key events leading from the overthrow of the Tsarist regime in February to the storming (as Eisenstein would have it) of the Winter Palace on October 25, when the Bolsheviks deposed the Provisional Government lead by Alexander Kerensky. October is a portrait of the October Revolution of 1917. I explore the nature of cinematic thinking in this paper using what I think are uncontroversial examples of cinematic experience: the viewing of various montage sequences from Eisenstein’s October. ![]() Much more might be said about the nature of cinematic experience in this context, though to do so would take me beyond the scope of this paper. Such an experience would not count as cinematic thinking on the definition in play even if it occurred directly in response to the film because it is not a cinematic experience as such. For example, we might think a matter through whilst temporarily disengaged from a film we are viewing. Nor is it thinking prompted by watching a film. I won’t venture answers these questions, but it is worth noting that understanding cinematic thinking in this way makes it a feature of cinematic spectatorship. Of course, this definition raises the question of what exactly cinematic experience is: how it differs from other kinds of experience and how it depends on the conventions, techniques and genres of cinema. Given this account of thinking, it is natural to define cinematic thinking as cinematic experience that enters the space of reasons. ![]() Thinking is, in this way, experience that enters the space of reasons. Thinking can be many things, but it invariably engages in some way or another with reasons and it does so in a way that can itself be the object of critical assessment and engagement. And, of course, thinking can make things worse: more muddled, obscure or tendentious. It can sometimes repeat patterns already well-established without adding anything of value to them. Sometimes it merely reconfirms beliefs and commitments and reinforces the way we already see them. What might have previously seemed like a poor reason for a belief might take on new significance after a bout of thinking. Rather than simply representing an argument, thinking might remove blockages to insight. Thinking sometimes leads us to see things in a new light. There is more to thinking than explicit argument and practical deliberation, however. At other times it furnishes reasons to adopt an attitude (for example, contempt or admiration) or to take action (for example, to buy a new phone or participate in an anti-government rally). Thinking sometimes furnishes reasons to believe a proposition. A reason is simply a consideration in favour of believing something, adopting an attitude towards something or doing something. Thinking always invites more thinking.īy thinking, we enter the space of reasons. ![]() To say that thinking is cognitively engaging is to say that others can follow it well enough to appreciate or criticize its cognitive features. Thinking is a special kind of experience: one that has representational content and one that is cognitively engaging. For the purposes of this paper, I am going to stipulate something narrower than this range of phenomena. “Thinking” is an ambiguous term and can mean anything from the structured development of a set of propositions to the largely unordered and non-propositional contemplation of a person or a thing. The idea of cinematic thinking first needs some clarification. October contains Eisenstein’s most celebrated attempts at intellectual montage. I do so through an examination of Eisenstein’s use of montage in the 1928 film October. In this paper, I attempt to make good on this promise. Examining the philosophical nature of intellectual montage as Eisenstein practices it, and reflects upon it, promises to shed light on the concept of cinematic thinking. However, they have a greater significance than this, especially in the context of contemporary interest in the nature of cinematic thinking. Eisenstein’s experiments with intellectual montage – the use of montage techniques to do intellectual work – might seem like no more than an episode in the history of Soviet montage. ![]()
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